BROWER AND SAENZ ON
DIVINE TRUTHMAKER SIMPLICITY
James R. Beebe
Jeffrey Brower has recently articulated a way to make sense of the doctrine
of divine simplicity using resources from contemporary truthmaker theory.
Noël Saenz has advanced two objections to Brower’s account, arguing that it
violates constraints on adequate metaphysical explanations at various points.
I argue that Saenz’s objections fail to show that Brower’s account is explanatorily inadequate.

I.
The doctrine of divine simplicity (which finds expression in the works of
Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas,1 inter alia) is the view that God is absolutely simple, lacking any distinct metaphysical parts or constituents. This
means that God is not even distinct from God’s goodness, God’s power,
or God’s wisdom, which in turn means that God’s goodness is not distinct from God’s power or God’s wisdom. If any of these items failed to be
identical, God would have components and would not be metaphysically
simple after all.
Alvin Plantinga has provided the most famous contemporary articulation of the central challenges facing such a view:
There are two difficulties, one substantial and the other truly monumental.
In the first place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then each
of his properties is identical with each of his properties, so that he has but
one property. This seems flatly incompatible with the obvious fact that God
has several properties; he has both power and mercifulness, say, neither of
which is identical with the other. In the second place, if God is identical
with each of his properties, then since each of his properties is a property, he
is a property—a self-exemplifying property. Accordingly God has just one
property: himself. This view is subject to a difficulty both obvious and overwhelming. No property could have created the world; no property could be
omniscient, or, indeed, know anything at all.2

1
Cf. Brower “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity,” 5 ff. for details on the historical roots
of this doctrine.
2
Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature?, 47.
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For reasons such as these, the doctrine of divine simplicity has fallen upon
hard times.
In a recent attempt to articulate and defend an account of divine simplicity that avoids standard objections to it, Jeffrey Brower draws upon
recent work in metaphysics on truthmaker theory.3 Truthmakers are the
entities in virtue of which truths are true.4 What is unique to the current debate about truthmakers is not the idea that truths are grounded
in reality but the prominence of the idea that truths can sometimes be
grounded in entities themselves as opposed to (facts about) how those
entities are. Taking this notion as his point of departure, Brower argues
that the doctrine of divine simplicity can be explained and shown to be coherent by taking it to be the thesis that the truthmaker for divine essential
predications is a metaphysically simple entity, viz., God.5 Somewhat more
formally, Brower’s view is the following:
(DTS) If an intrinsic essential predication of the form “God is F” is true,
then (i) God’s F-ness exists, (ii) God’s F-ness is the truthmaker of
‘God is F,’ and (iii) God’s F-ness is identical with God.
From (ii) and (iii), it obviously follows that God is the truthmaker of “God
is F.” On this account, the truthmakers of “God is good” and “God is
powerful” are God’s goodness and God’s power, each of which is identical
with God. Unlike many accounts of divine simplicity that interpret God’s
F-ness as a property and thus make God identical with a property, DTS
simply identifies God’s F-ness with whatever makes “God is F” true. On
DTS, what makes divine essential predications true is God himself—not
facts about how God is or facts or states of affairs composed of God and
properties that are distinct from God.
Although theists do not all agree about which divine predications are
extrinsic or accidental, for true divine predications that are both extrinsic
and accidental, Brower maintains that God alone will not be the truthmaker. The truthmaker for a statement such as “God is cursed by atheists”
will be something like a fact or state of affairs composed of God, atheists,
and cursing. And if God’s being cursed by atheists exists, it will not be identical with God. Similarly, if the truth of “Plato is cursed by Aristotelians”
requires the existence of Plato’s being cursed by Aristotelians exists, the latter
will be something like a fact or state of affairs composed of Plato, Aristotelians, and cursing. And this will not be identical with Plato. In the case
of true intrinsic essential predications to contingent beings—e.g., “Plato is
human” or “Plato is an animal”—Brower and other truthmaker theorists
contend that Plato alone is the truthmaker. However, if Plato’s humanity
and Plato’s animality exist, they will not be identical with Plato. Thus, it

Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity” and “Simplicity and Aseity.”
See Rodriguez-Pereyra, “Truthmakers,” and MacBride, “Truthmakers.”
5
Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity.”
3
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is only in the case of intrinsic essential predications that different sorts of
explanations will need to be given for divine and human beings.
While Brower argues that the explanation of divine simplicity in terms
of truthmakers avoids various well-known objections that have been
raised against the doctrine,6 Noël Saenz has recently argued that DTS
faces difficulties of its own. Saenz’s first objection to Brower’s account of
divine truthmaker simplicity maintains that DTS fails to satisfy the following important constraint on metaphysical explanation:
Truthmakers are supposed to be that which gives a metaphysical ground
of truth, and grounds are supposed to be explanatory in nature. That is, if x
makes < p > true, then x (or x’s existence) metaphysically explains why < p >
is true.7

Saenz maintains that—contrary to Brower and indeed most truthmaker
theorists—individuals by themselves cannot satisfy this explanatory
burden:
To use Brower’s example, take an intrinsic essential predication of Plato,
< Plato is a human > and ask “what makes this proposition true?” Notice that
the answer cannot be Plato. Why? Because saying that this proposition is true
in virtue of Plato or that Plato makes it true, and therefore explains why it is
true that he is human, is explanatorily empty. . . . Plato, the concrete being,
is just not rich enough to provide, on his own, a metaphysical ground of the
truth of < Plato is a human >. However, if the answer to the above question is
that the proposition is true because Plato instantiates being a human, or that
the state of affairs of Plato’s being a human explains that it is true that Plato
is a human, then I have been told something that is explanatorily helpful.8

Applying this line of argument to divine intrinsic essential predications,
Saenz writes, “Merely pointing to God as an answer to “what makes
< God is omnibenevolent > true?” is explanatorily empty.”9 In short, Saenz
maintains that how concrete individuals are can be explanatory, but
those individuals themselves cannot be. According to DTS, however, God
himself is the truthmaker for intrinsic essential divine predications, and according to Brower’s broader perspective on truthmakers, Plato alone—not
how Plato is—is the truthmaker for “Plato is human.” On the basis of these
explanatory shortcomings, Saenz concludes that DTS should be rejected.
An initial thing to note about Saenz’s first objection is that it is generally
accepted among truthmaker theorists that concrete individuals alone can
serve as truthmakers for intrinsic essential predications.10 This means that,
while Saenz describes the focus of his attack as Brower’s DTS, his primary
target is actually a widely supported doctrine within the truthmaker comBrower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity” and “Simplicity and Aseity.”
Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 463–464.
8
Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 464.
9
Saenz ,“Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 468.
10
E.g., Bigelow, The Reality of Numbers, 128; Lewis, “Armstrong on Combinatorial Possibility,” 204; and Rodriguez-Pereyra, “Truthmakers,” 192.
6
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munity that stands behind DTS. This point is not an objection, but it does
highlight that Saenz’s choice of target sets the bar for the success of his
argument rather high.
In a recent attempt to defuse Saenz’s first objection, Timothy Pawl appeals to the following distinction between metaphysical explanation and
epistemic explanation that has been articulated by Karen Bennett:11
Metaphysical Explanation: “To say that one thing explainsM another is to say
that the first fully accounts for the second, that the first makes the second
exist or obtain or happen.”
Epistemic Explanation: “To say that one things explainsE another is to say
that the first renders the second intelligible, sheds light on how or why it
happened, or perhaps puts an end to a line of questioning.”

In response to Saenz, Pawl then argues:
On Bennett’s view, the grounding of truths in things (truthmaking) only requires metaphysical explanation, not epistemic explanation. . . . Now, being
that in virtue of which a proposition is true does not carry a requirement
that the thing in virtue of which it is true be structured, or that it answer
“why” questions satisfactorily. Or, at very least, if being that in virtue of
which a truth is true requires structure and answering “why” questions satisfactorily, that hasn’t been shown. Brower’s sense of “explain” is closer to
Bennett’s metaphysical sense than it is to her epistemic sense. It seems to me
that Brower and his compatriots should deny, along with Bennett, that truthmakers must epistemically explain the truths they make true.12

Thus, while Saenz argues that because Brower’s DTS fails explanatorily,
it fails to be correct, Pawl argues that DTS fails explanatorily in only one
sense but that it succeeds explanatorily in another sense. I agree with Pawl
that Saenz’s charge of explanatory inadequacy is faulty, and I think Pawl is
correct in thinking that different senses of explanation are being conflated
by Saenz. However, I think that Pawl’s use of Bennett’s distinctions results
in conceding too much to Saenz.
The central reason is that metaphysical explanations explain. As such,
they render things intelligible, shed light on how or why things happen,
and put an end to certain lines of questioning. According to Bennett, statements of the following form can be true:
(E1) X explainsM Y, but X does not explainE Y.
Since Bennett’s metaphysical explanation involves “fully accounting for”
something, and epistemic explanation involves shedding light on things,
this means that statements of the following form should be true as well:
11

Bennett, Making Things Up, 61.

Pawl, “In Defense of Divine Truthmaker Simplicity.” Pawl’s text is drawn from a conference presentation. A version of this presentation, perhaps somewhat revised, will appear
in Res Philosophica.
12
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(E2) X fully accounts for Y, but X does not shed any light on Y.
However, this statement seems extremely counterintuitive, if not strange.
Bennett’s characterization of metaphysical explanations thus seems problematic.
Pawl grants that truthmakers do not do the things that epistemic explanations do and thereby concedes that Saenz is correct in maintaining that
appealing to concrete entities as truthmakers falls short explanatorily. In
fact, Pawl seems to concede that appeals to any kind of truthmakers (and
not simply appeals to concrete entities as truthmakers) fall short of the explanatory ideal set by epistemic explanations. (There are even indications
that Pawl may concede that explanations in metaphysics in general fall
short of this ideal.) However, Pawl wants to claim that falling short in this
fashion is not problematic. I think these concessions should be resisted.
In contrast to metaphysical explanations, epistemic explanations are
supposed to put an end to lines of questioning. But here are some lines of
questioning to which truthmaker explanations put an end:
(T1) Why is < p > true?
(T2) What makes < p > true?
(T3) What grounds the truth of < p >?
(T4) How is the truth of < p > grounded in reality?
(T5) What sort of grounding of the truth of < p > is provided by its
truthmaker?
(T6) What sort of entity is it that grounds the truth of < p >?
(T7) Do different categories of truths have different grounds?
(T8) Do true intrinsic predications have different sorts of truthmakers
than true extrinsic predications?
(T9) Do true essential predications have different sorts of truthmakers
than true accidental predications?
(T10) If the truth of ‘a is F’ is grounded in or made true by how a is, is how
a is an entity? If so, what sort of entity is it?
Granted, there might be some lines of questioning that metaphysical
explanations in general or truthmaker explanations in particular fail to
bring to an end. But in itself this is no objection. It is no objection to the
explanations of spacetime provided by the equations of Einstein’s theory
of relativity that they fail to explain why pondering the vastness of spacetime tends to fill us with a sense of awe. Thus, instead of conceding to
Saenz that appeals to particular kinds of truthmakers (and perhaps metaphysical explanations in general) fall short explanatorily in some sense,
I contend that reflection on the nature of the metaphysical explanations
provided by truthmakers reveals that they do in fact explain (i.e., render
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things intelligible, shed light on how or why things happen, and put an
end to certain lines of questioning).
While Bennett’s distinction between metaphysical and epistemic explanation does not help to explain where Saenz’s first objection goes wrong, I
think that Pawl is correct in suggesting that at least some of the time Saenz
confuses different senses of “explanation” that need to be distinguished. I
propose that one relevant distinction is between things in reality that are
responsible for a proposition’s being true and speech acts performed to
describe those things. For example, if someone asks why a helium atom
is positively charged, the explanation will be that the atom’s nucleus contains two positively charged protons and two neutrally charged neutrons
while its electron shell contains only one negatively charged electron. On
the one hand, there are the number, kinds, and arrangement of things in
reality—the protons, neutrons, electrons, and the atomic structure. On
the other hand, there is the sentence or speech act whose content is < The
atom’s nucleus contains two positively charged protons and two neutrally
charged neutrons while its electron shell contains only one negatively
charged electron >. In some sense, either one of these could be considered
the explanation of the atom’s positive charge. From one perspective, what
answers the relevant why-question is the existence of more protons than
electrons within the atom. From another perspective, however, what
answers the question is what Niels said to Ernest when he said “The atom’s nucleus contains two positively charged protons and two neutrally
charged neutrons while its electron shell contains only one negatively
charged electron.”
Saenz makes a point that seems to trade on an implicit conflation of
these two senses of explanation when he writes, “Merely pointing to God
as an answer to ‘what makes < God is omnibenevolent > true?’ is explanatorily empty.”13 Saenz is asking us to imagine a communicative situation
where a why-question has been asked but where the would-be explainer
does nothing more than referentially designate God.14 A response that
consisted of a single-word answer like this would seem to be conversationally inappropriate and to fail to satisfy the explanatory demands of the
situation. However, the fuller truthmaker answer would not simply be the
single-word answer “God.” Rather, it would involve a story about the ways
in which truth-bearers are made true by things in reality, the kinds of things
that can serve as truth-bearers and truthmakers, and whatever relations of
necessitation obtain between the two. Thus, the fact such a single-word
speech act of the sort envisioned would violate relevant conversational
norms does not show that individual entities cannot serve as metaphysical
13

Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 468.

Saenz (“Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 467) seems to be doing the same sort
of thing in the following passage: “Insofar as truthmakers are supposed to metaphysically
explain why truths are true (as Brower himself accepts), then merely appealing to a thing
in order to explain why intrinsic essential claims about that thing are true is to provide a
truthmaker that is too course-grained.”
14
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grounds of truth—nor does it show that they cannot function in illuminating metaphysical explanations of important philosophical phenomena.
Furthermore, in the domain of reality (as opposed to speech acts),
Saenz asserts truthmaker explanations violate structural constraints on
explanations:
Plato, the concrete being, is just not rich enough to provide, on his own, a
metaphysical ground of the truth of < Plato is a human >.15
There needs to be a kind match between what is true and its truthmaker. If
it is true that something is some way, then what makes it true must be structured in the right kind of way if it is to explain why the predication applies
to it. Plato is just not structured in the way he needs to be if he is to explain
why “is a human” applies to him. But then Plato cannot explain why < Plato
is a human > is true.16
Insofar as truthmakers are supposed to metaphysically explain why truths
are true (as Brower himself accepts), then merely appealing to a thing in
order to explain why intrinsic essential claims about that thing are true is to
provide a truthmaker that is too course-grained. We (including Armstrong)
need to dig deeper, and provide more structure in our ontology, if we want
satisfactory truthmakers here.17

Saenz thus asserts that a truthmaker must have some appropriate structure that corresponds in some way to the structure of what it makes true.
However, truthmaker theory denies these claims and indeed to a certain
extent is built upon their denial. Simply asserting a view that is contrary
to truthmaker theory fails to show the latter to be false.
Moreover, it seems straightforwardly false to claim that an explanans
can never have less structure than its explanandum. This is tantamount to
claiming that the complex must always be explained in terms of the equally
complex. As a general constraint on explanation, this seems quite unintuitive. Consider the familiar Newtonian equation for universal gravitation:
(G) F = G(m1 x m2)/r2
Does G have as much structure as the full range of physical phenomena
whose behavior it can explain? It is difficult to see how this can be so.
Similar thoughts apply to any case where a universally quantified law of
nature is capable of explaining a broad range of phenomena.
Saenz thus owes us a more detailed explanation of what constraints
on metaphysical explanations truthmaker explanations allegedly fail to
satisfy and why appeals to concrete individuals with less structure than
the truths they purport to ground are supposed to be explanatorily empty.
Because Saenz has not done this, his first objection to DTS cannot be
deemed successful.
15

Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 464.

16

Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 465.

17

Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 467.
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II.
Saenz’s second objection to DTS18 concerns a puzzle about the choice between the following claims:
(1) God is wise because God is divine.19
(2) God is divine, at least in part, because God is wise.20
These claims concern what Saenz calls a “priority ordering between God’s
intrinsic essential predications”21—either predications of God’s wisdom
are explanatorily prior to predications of God’s divinity or predications
of God’s divinity are explanatorily prior to predications of God’s wisdom.
Saenz contends that a choice between (1) and (2) must be made because
they represent “jointly exhaustive, mutually exclusive, positions”:
Jointly exhaustive because it is just false that the truth of < God is wise > is not
in any way explanatorily related to the truth of < God is divine > . . . . Mutually exclusive because (1) and (2) cannot both be true on pain of violating the
irreflexivity of explanation.22

Saenz notes that many theists, including Brower, opt for (1). Brower, for
example, writes:
Traditional theists standardly derive the intrinsic divine attributes (or better,
the truth of predications involving them) from their understanding of the
divine nature. That is to say, they take God to be not only good, powerful,
wise, and just, but to be all these things in virtue of being divine.23

Saenz argues that there are three ways the proponent of divine simplicity
can understand this preference for (1) over (2):
(P1) Maintain that the explanatory priority of predications of God’s divinity over predications of God’s wisdom is a purely conceptual
matter;
(P2) Maintain that the explanatory priority of predications of God’s
divinity over predications of God’s wisdom is a non-conceptual
matter that is based upon a dependency in reality; or
(P3) Take the explanatory priority of predications of God’s divinity
over predications of God’s wisdom to be a brute, unexplained fact.
Saenz argues that each of these options is problematic for the proponent
of DTS and concludes that as a result DTS—and indeed any account of
divine simplicity—should be rejected.
18

Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” sec. 2.

19

Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 468.

20

Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 469.

21

Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 468.

22

Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 469.

23

Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity,” 117.
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The first point I would like to make about this objection is that the
doctrine of divine simplicity does not seem to require theists to accept
the central assumption behind Saenz’s dilemma, viz., that “[t]here exists a
kind of priority ordering between God’s intrinsic essential predications.”24
If God is simple, and God’s divinity and God’s wisdom are not ontologically distinct, it seems open to the proponent of divine simplicity to claim
that predications regarding God’s divinity do not stand in relations of
explanatory priority (or dependency) to predications of God’s wisdom.
In other words, the dilemma that Saenz is concerned with in his second
objection takes aim at the doctrine of divine simplicity only when it is
combined with an additional doctrine. Thus, in a way that is reminiscent
of Saenz’s first objection, the present objection is not a fully direct attack
on DTS itself.
Saenz offers the following reason for thinking there are relations of
explanatory priority and dependency between distinct divine intrinsic
essential predications:
God’s intrinsic essential predications are not simply a list of predications every one of which is independent from every other. They are rather a unified
and elegant lot.25

However, standing in relations of explanatory priority and dependency
is only one way in which a set of predications can be unified rather than
completely disparate. For example, two predications can be unified in
virtue of being necessarily coextensive. Relations of mutual entailment
might obtain between the predications without any of them being more
fundamental than any other. Moreover, they might be unified in virtue
of having the same metaphysical ground. Thus, explanatory priority and
dependency is only one kind of glue that might unify a set of predications.
Pawl responds to Saenz’s second objection by again appealing to the
distinction between metaphysical and epistemic explanation and arguing
as follows:
I see no reason to think that the proponent of Divine Truthmaker Simplicity
requires an epistemic reading of the “because” in (1) or (2). On a metaphysical reading of the explanation claims, the proponent of Divine Truthmaker
Simplicity should say that neither predication is true because of the other
(in Bennett’s metaphysical sense). Rather, both are true because of God. This
response denies the need for an epistemic explanation of the form Saenz is
asking for in his initial question and his concluding challenge. Rather than
an epistemic explanation, there’s a metaphysical explanation (in Bennett’s
sense). And rather than that metaphysical explanation holding between two
propositions, that God is wise, that God is divine, it holds instead between
God and each proposition individually.26

24

Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 468.

25

Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 468.

26

Pawl, “In Defense of Divine Truthmaker Simplicity.”

Faith and Philosophy

482

Although I have indicated above why I think that Pawl should not rely
upon Bennett’s distinctions between kinds of explanation, I agree with
Pawl that the proponent of divine simplicity should insist upon metaphysically explaining (the ground of truth of) predications of God’s
divinity and God’s wisdom in God himself. In one sense, this amounts to
a rejection of the dilemma for divine simplicity as represented in Saenz’s
second objection—at least in the terms that it was posed.
Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and Brower all endorse P1. P2 represents
the rejection of divine simplicity, since it asserts there is a real distinction and dependency relation between God’s divinity and God’s wisdom.
Proponents of divine simplicity also do not endorse P3. Saenz offers the
following argument against option P1:
It is a conceptual truth that anyone who satisfies BACHELOR does so in
virtue of satisfying UNMARRIED and MALE since BACHELOR decomposes into UNMARRIED and MALE. And it is a conceptual falsehood that
anyone who satisfies UNMARRIED and MALE does so in virtue of satisfying BACHELOR since neither UNMARRIED nor MALE decomposes into
bachelor. So the pattern of dependency exemplified in (3) [Bill is a bachelor
because Bill is an unmarried male] is explained by appealing to the pattern
of dependency exemplified by the concepts involved in (3). Unfortunately,
this kind of explanation will not work in our present case. After all, (2) is a
conceptually coherent claim. One could defend (2) against (1) without being
confused about the concepts WISDOM and DIVINITY. It is a live debate
whether we should accept (1) over (2), as it would not be if the disagreement
over them boiled down to a disagreement over the concepts involved (as it
plausibly does in the bachelor case). (1) is therefore not a conceptual truth.
Brower agrees when, to paraphrase him, he says that it is a real question
whether the list of divine predications (God is good, powerful, wise, just)
depend on the predication of God’s being divine, but that it is at least coherent to say that they do. But it wouldn’t be a real question if (1) were a conceptual truth. If (1) were a conceptual truth, the question would be settled
decisively in favor of (1).27

Saenz is suggesting that conceptual questions are easily answered, conceptual truths easily discerned, and conceptual disputes easily resolved.
If that were the case, the analysis of the concepts EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION, PERSONAL IDENTITY, and MORALLY CORRECT ACTION
would have been resolved long ago. It is a live question how the concept of
EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION is related to the concepts of RELIABILITY,
EVIDENCE, COHERENCE, EPISTEMIC DUTY, and EPISTEMIC VIRTUE.
Furthermore, one epistemologist can think JUSTIFIED BELIEF is conceptually prior to KNOWLEDGE while another can think that the reverse
is true without either one of them being guilty of elementary confusions
about the concepts involved. To think that “It is a live debate whether
< p >” and “It is a real question whether < p >” both entail “It is not a conceptual question whether < p >” seems to indicate a lack of familiarity with
27

Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 470.
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the practice of philosophy. The analysis of philosophically interesting concepts is much more difficult and fraught with subtle disagreements than
the analysis of simple concepts like BACHELOR.
Saenz mistakenly claims that Brower seems to agree with him that (1)
and (2) are not dealing with purely conceptual matters.28 Brower makes it
quite clear in several places that he thinks whatever distinctions there are
between divine essential attributes are merely conceptual and concern the
sense rather than the reference of these terms. For example, Brower writes:
For even if God is absolutely simple, and hence identical with each of his
constituents, we can still draw a conceptual distinction between God’s nature
and his justice or power (for surely expressions such as ‘God’s nature,’ ‘God’s
justice,’ and ‘God’s power’ are distinct in sense, even if not in reference).29
What is needed is an account that is both thin enough to preserve the categorial neutrality of referents of expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness,’ while at
the same time thick enough to enable us to distinguish such referents when
they are either in fact distinct (as in the case of Socrates’ nature and Socrates’
goodness) or merely conceptually distinct (as in the case of God’s nature and
God’s goodness).30

Indeed, Brower makes it abundantly clear that he is following a long tradition of distinguishing between merely conceptual distinctions among the
divine essential attributes and any real distinctions between them. For example, Brower cites Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, who write:
According to the doctrine of simplicity, what human beings call God’s omnipotence or God’s omniscience is the single eternal action considered under
descriptions they find variously illuminating, or recognized by them under
different kinds of effects or manifestations of it. What the doctrine requires
one to understand about all the designations for the divine attributes is that
they are all identical in reference but different in sense, referring in various
ways to the one actual entity which is God himself or designating various
manifestations of it. ‘Perfect power’ and ‘perfect knowledge’ are precise
analogues for ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’: non-synonymous
expressions designating quite distinct manifestations of one and the same
thing. . . . The respect in which God is utterly devoid of real distinctions does
not, after all, preclude our conceptually distinguishing God’s actions in the
world from one another or from God himself.31

While Plato’s wisdom and Plato’s justice are distinct in both sense and reference, God’s wisdom and God’s justice are distinct only in sense. Yet if the
distinctions between these divine attributes are merely conceptual and not
based in reality, it is clear that whatever priority or dependence there is
between predications regarding these attributes is also purely conceptual
rather than real.
28

Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 470.
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Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity,” 16

30

Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity,” 23.

31

Stump and Kretzmann, “Absolute Simplicity,” 356–357.
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In light of the reasons articulated in this section, I conclude that Saenz’s
second (and final) objection to DTS fails to show that DTS should be rejected.
III.
Saenz has attempted to undermine Brower’s recent articulation of divine
truthmaker simplicity by arguing that the latter runs afoul of various
constraints on metaphysical explanations. Saenz’s two main objections
are aimed at doctrines that either lie behind (objection one) or are often
associated with (objection two) DTS. In each case, I have argued that
Saenz makes implausible or at least unsubstantiated claims about what
metaphysical explanation requires and have suggested ways in which the
proponent of DTS can respond.
University at Buffalo
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